This paper introduces a new incentive compatible mechanism which for general preference environments implements Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibria. This mechanism does not increase in structural complexity as consumers are added to the economy, the minimum dimension of data needed to compute payo¤s is smaller than other mechanisms with comparable properties; and for quasi-linear environments, this mechanism induces a supermodular game for appropriate choices of the mechanism parameters. Thus, this new Lindahl mechanism provides a connection between the desirable welfare properties of Lindahl allocations and the desirable theoretical/ convergence properties of supermodular games.
Introduction
The reliance on unregulated markets for the provision of public goods presents well known challenges to e¢ ciency. For economists, the existence of this problem continues to motivate the search for alternative institutions which may yield Pareto optimal outcomes. One problem with this approach is that some Pareto outcomes may not be desirable for everyone involved. Some people could end up being worse o¤ than they were with their original endowment, University of Arizona, Department of Economics, mvanesse@email.arizona.edu. I am grateful to Rabah Amir, Martin Dufwenberg, Mark Walker, and John Wooders for helpful comments. a common critique, for example, of the Groves-Ledyard (G-L) mechanism. G-L is an institution that overcomes the free riding problem -the incentive to enjoy the public good's bene…ts while not sharing in its cost -but the mechanism may leave some participants worse o¤ than before they participated. For this reason, Lindahl allocations are attractive outcomes for an economy with a public good.
Lindahl allocations are Pareto optimal and also individually rational, and they are closely related to Walrasian ("competitive") allocations of private goods. In the Walrasian setting consumers all face the same price and they demand potentially di¤erent quantities of a good; in the Lindahl setting they face distinct "personalized" prices and, in equilibrium, each consumer demands the same quantity of the public good. Lindahl allocations share many of the attractive properties of Walrasian allocations. Perhaps the most salient is that no one is made worse o¤ at the Lindahl allocation than he was at his initial endowment. Unfortunately, actually implementing a Lindahl scheme is somewhat problematic since it is not exactly clear how the personalized prices are to be determined. Perhaps one could use surveys, but there may then be incentives for participants in the surveys to misrepresent their preferences in order to pay a lower price. This has led to the development of incentive compatible public goods mechanisms.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new incentive compatible mechanism which attains Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibria. This is true for economies with an arbitrary number of consumers and general preference environments. In addition to this "Nash" implementation result, the mechanism has a several other attractive properties that have been motivated by experimental research: it retains its structural simplicity as the number of consumers increases; the minimum dimension of data needed to compute payo¤s is smaller than other mechanisms with comparable properties; the components of the mechanism have a clear economic interpretation; and for quasi-linear preference environments the unique equilibrium is stable under a wide variety of learning algorithms.
The mechanism introduced here is not the …rst to implement Lindahl allocations. Hurwicz (1979) and Walker (1981) were the …rst to present such mechanisms, but Kim (1987) has shown that both mechanisms are quite unstable. While some sort of dynamic stability is desired, there is no agreement in the literature about how people's behavior adjusts when out of equilibrium. In mechanism-design experiments, however, a common empirical …nding is that in mechanisms with theoretically robust dynamic stability properties, subjects'behavior tends to converge. Supermodular mechanisms have been particularly successful. 1 This empirical regularity was presaged by the theoretical stability results established by Milgrom and Roberts (1990a) for supermodular games. Chen's (2002) theoretical contribution is of particular interest. She presented the …rst Lindahl mechanism that is supermodular in quasi-linear environments for some values of the mechanism parameters. Thus she ties the observation that supermodular mechanisms tend to perform better in the laboratory to the welfare properties of Lindahl equilibria. The Chen mechanism has also had some initial success in a laboratory environment. Van Essen, Lazzati, and Walker (2007) experimentally tested three Lindahl mechanisms, including the Chen mechanism, …nding that it converged quite close to its equilibrium messages. However, there are several reasons to be dissatis…ed with this initial success. In its published form, the Chen mechanism does not maintain its structure as the number of consumers are added to the economy; the amount of information consumers need to compute their payo¤s increases in the number of participants. The experimental evidence suggests that the mechanism generates large amounts of tax waste when not in equilibrium, and participants frequently did worse than their initial endowment. The Lindahl mechanism presented in this paper builds upon Chen's contribution by addressing these concerns in the design stage.
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows: Section 2 provides a simple de…nition of a supermodular game and summarizes some of the important properties these games exhibit; Section 3 outlines the basic public goods problem and mechanism environments; Section 4 contains the bulk of the paper's theoretical results concerning implementation; …nally, Section 5 compares the new Lindahl mechanism with several existing ones in order to clarify the paper's contribution.
Preliminaries
Supermodularity plays a signi…cant role in several of the results to follow. In this section we review some de…nitions, framed in terms of the strategy spaces and payo¤ functions used in this paper. Speci…cally, the strategy spaces are subsets of Euclidean spaces and the payo¤ functions are twice continuously di¤erentiable (or C 2 ). More general de…nitions of a supermodular game can be found in Topkis (1998) or Milgrom and Roberts (1990a) .
A normal form game is de…ned by a set of players, a strategy set for each player, and a payo¤ function for each player. Denote the set of players I, where I = f1; :::; N g. Functions belonging to players are indexed by a superscript while arguments are indexed by a subscript. Let M i R 2 be player i's strategy space with an arbitrary element m i = (m i1 ; m i2 ), where M = N i=1 M i is the collection of all player's strategy spaces. Last, for each player i let u i : M ! R be a payo¤ function which maps strategy pro…les into a numerical payo¤.
In addition to these requirements, a supermodular game has two additional criteria on its payo¤ functions. The …rst criterion is that a player's marginal utility for increasing an action is increasing in his own actions. This is known as the supermodularity property and is de…ned below.
De…nition 1 A C 2 payo¤ function u i is supermodular if a player's own actions are strategic compliments-i.e. for each i @u i (m) @m i1 @m i2 0:
The second criterion requires that the marginal utility of each player for increasing an action is increasing in all of their rivals'actions. This is known as the increasing di¤erence property and is de…ned below.
De…nition 2 A C 2 payo¤ function u i has increasing di¤erences if a player's own actions are strategic compliments with the actions of all other playersi.e. for each i @u i (m) @m in @m jl 0 for n = 1; 2 and l = 1; 2.
A game is supermodular if the payo¤s for all players satisfy both the supermodular and increasing di¤erence properties. This is formalized below.
De…nition 3 A game is supermodular if for each player i: M i is a nonempty subset of R 2 ; u i has the supermodularity and increasing di¤erence properties.
Supermodular games have nice properties which make them interesting to mechanism designers. If the strategy space is compact and the payo¤ function is C 2 , then Milgrom and Roberts (1990a) show that:
1. The set of serially undominated strategy pro…les has a maximum and a minimum element, and these elements are Nash equilibria;
2. Under a wide class of dynamic adjustment processes the predicted bounds on behavior eventually ends up between the two extreme Nash equilibria. These dynamic processes include best-response dynamics, …ctitious play, Bayesian learning, and others.
When the Nash equilibrium is unique, the predictive power of these results is increased. The …rst property implies that the game is dominance solvable and the second property says that the unique Nash equilibrium is "stable" under a wide range of adaptive behavior.
In the next section, I explain the public good environment, which can be thought of as a simpli…ed general equilibrium problem.
The Public Good Economy
Without loss of generality, I restrict attention to the simplest of economies, those which have N 2 consumers, one private good, one public good, and a constant returns to scale production technology. The quantity of the public good will be denoted by x, and the private good for consumer i by y i , where consumers are indexed by subscript i. Each consumer is characterized by a convex consumption set C i = R 2 + , an initial endowment of the private good ! i > 0, and no initial endowment of the public good. The public good is produced, using the private good as an input (denoted z), with a constant returns to scale production technology f (z) = z -i.e., each unit of the public good x requires units ( > 0) of the private good. Thus is the constant (real) marginal cost of production. An allocation in this simple economy is an N + 1-tuple (x; y 1 ; :::; y N ) 2 R N +1 + .
The Mechanism
A mechanism takes consumers'strategies (or messages), and maps them into an outcome (or allocation). Here I consider a mechanism in which consumers report messages to a "planner" who uses this information to determine an amount of the public good to produce and a tax for each consumer. The message space of consumer i is M i = R 2 with generic element m i = (r i ; s i ) : Let m = (m 1 ; :::; m N ) denote the pro…le of all players'messages. Consumer i's action r i should be interpreted as a request from the consumer to the planner for r i units of the public good. Notice that negative requests are allowed. Consumer i's other action, s i , is interpreted as his statement about the amount of the public good that will be produced. Rather than write (r 1 ; s 1 ; r 2 ; s 2 ; :::) for a strategy pro…le, I write (r 1 ; r 2 ; :::; r N ; s 1 ; :::; s N ) = (r; s). These messages are collected by a planner authority and used to determine an amount of the public good and a tax for each player i according to outcome functions (r; s) and i (r; s) respectively. For any positive real numbers , , and , let ' ; ; (r; s) = (r; s);
be a mechanism with outcome functions de…ned as follows:
! can be thought of as i's personalized price for the public good and , , > 0 are positive parameters. Furthermore, interpret s N +1 = s 1 . 2 In words, the mechanism works as follows: the planner collects each consumer's request and produces an amount of the public good equal to the average request; in addition both the requests and statements are used to determine each consumer's tax. A consumer's tax is composed of two parts, a per unit tax and a statement penalty. The statement penalty for consumer i is increasing in the di¤erence his and his neighbor's (consumer i + 1) statements are from the actual amount of the public good produced. Speci…cally, if consumer i's statement is incorrect, he is penalized by the amount of the di¤erence according to the penalty term 2 (s i (r; s)) 2 . A similar penalty is assessed to consumer i if consumer i + 1's statement is incorrect. It is clear in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium that since preference are strictly increasing in y i , utility maximizing behavior from consumers will result in correct statements. Consequently, in equilibrium, the squared penalty terms will drop out of the tax function and P i (r; s) can be interpreted as the per unit cost for consumer i. Note that i's personalized price function P i (r; s) is independent of i's decisions.
This personalized price function has an intuitive economic interpretation. The mechanism charges higher personalized prices to those consumers who are perceived by their neighbors (consumer i+1) to demand more of the good than others and lower prices to those who request less of the public good. The term P j6 =i r j N 1 corresponds to the amount of the public good if consumer i did not participate in the mechanism. The term s i+1 represents consumer i + 1's statement about the level or quantity of the public good. Thus if P j6 =i r j N 1 > s i+1 , it means that consumer i + 1 believes that consumer i's request will lower the level of the public good produced. As a consequence, i's personalized price is less than an equal share of the marginal cost. If P j6 =i r j N 1 < s i+1 , then the reverse is true and consumer i's personalized prize is greater than an equal share of the marginal cost. If P j6 =i r j N 1 = s i+1 , the personalized price is the equal share of the marginal cost.
Preference and Wealth Assumptions
The coupling of the mechanism ' ; ; (r; s) and a preference environment de-…ne a game. I am interested in two types of preference environments: …rst, a "regular" environment where preferences satisfy a set of consistency requirements; second, a sub-case of the regular environment that satis…es some additional properties. The de…nitions of these environments are given below.
De…nition 4
The set of regular preference environments de…ned, for each player, a complete and transitive preference relation % i that satis…es the following properties:
(Strictly Increasing in y
Let E denote the set of regular preference environments with generic element e. The next set of preference environments impose a functional structure that will be important when I present the supermodularity and stability results in section 4.
De…nition 5 E Q denotes the set of standard C 2 quasi-linear environmentsi.e. those in which, for each i, there is a real valued function v i such that u i (x; y i ) = y i +v i (x), v i is C 2 , concave and whose second derivative is bounded from below by some real number K i such that 1 < K i
Finally, I assume that in equilibrium, no consumer can be in his minimum wealth. I formally de…ne this condition below, but in words, this condition states that in equilibrium, it must be possible to …nd a cheaper, feasible consumption bundle. This condition is essentially needed to rule out potential pathological cases. 3 De…nition 6 (The "No Minimum Wealth Condition"): If ( r; s) is a Nash equilibrium there exists y i and (r i ; s i ) such that (y i ; (r i ; r i ; s i ; s i )) 2 C i and
Implementation
The …rst result of this paper shows that the game induced by the mechanism ' ; ; (r; s) implements Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibrium outcomes. Implementation is an exact coincidence of Lindahl and Nash outcomes. In other words, if there is a Lindahl allocation, it can be achieved as the allocation of a Nash equilibrium; second, if there is a Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium allocation is Lindahl.
Theorem 1 The mechanism ' ; ; implements the Lindahl allocations for any e 2 E.
Proof. See Appendix.
The Lindahl equilibria are also associated with two fundamental welfare theorems of the public good economy (for economies that satisfy the conditions of these theorems). First, like Walrasian equilibria, Lindahl allocations are Pareto optimal. Second, any Pareto optimal allocation can be supported as a Lindahl equilibrium through appropriate redistribution of the initial endowment !. The exact conditions needed for the existence of Lindahl equilibria can be found in Milleron (1972) or Foley (1970) . Notice that Theorem 1 does not impose any restrictions on the positive parameters , , and . These are free parameters which will be manipulated later in this paper to create a family of supermodular Lindahl mechanisms.
In order to illustrate the dual nature of this theorem the following example may be useful.
Example 1 Consider the following two-consumer economy where each consumer is endowed with ! = 20 units of the private good. Suppose it takes 4 units of the private good y to produce a unit of the public good x and that Consumer 1 and Consumer 2's preferences can be represented by the utility functions u 1 (x; y 1 ) = y 1 1 2 (6 x) 2 and u 2 (x; y 2 ) = y 2 1 2 (8 x) 2 respectively. The mechanism ' 1;1;1 (m) implements the Lindahl allocations of this economy.
Implementation of Lindahl allocations requires: …rst, if there is a Lindahl allocation, then it can be achieved as a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism; second, if there is a Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium allocation is Lindahl. For this example, I start with the …rst implication.
Using the Samuelson marginal condition (i.e., that at a Pareto optimal quantity of the public good P M RS i = ), the Pareto optimal level of the public good for these two consumers is x P O = 5. Plugging this quantity into each consumer's demand for the public good, I …nd the corresponding Lindahl prices for Consumer 1 and 2 are P 1 = 1 and P 2 = 3 respectively. Therefore this example has a unique Lindahl allocation. If the Lindahl allocation is to be achieved as a Nash equilibrium of mechanism ' 1;1;1 (m), then two equations must hold: …rst, the average request must equal the Pareto optimal amount, i.e.,
second, Player 1's personalized price function must equal his Lindahl price P 1 = 1, i.e.,
Any equilibrium that achieves this allocation requires Consumer 2's statement to be correct (i.e., s 2 = 5), it follows from the second equation that r 2 = 6. Thus, the strategy pro…le [( r 1 ; s 1 ); ( r 2 ; s 2 )] = [(4; 5); (6; 5)] is the only pro…le which could achieve that Lindahl outcome as an equilibrium. I now show that this pro…le is a Nash equilibrium by checking that Consumer 1 is best responding to Consumer 2's strategy and vice versa.
Consumer 1's best response problem is to maximize his utility subject to a feasible set de…ned by Consumer 2's strategy and the mechanism. Since in a best response Consumer 1 strategy satis…es s 1 = 1 2 r 1 + 1 2 r 2 (or s 1 = (r 1 ; r 2 ; s 1 ; s 2 )), Consumer 1's best response problem simpli…es to
The …rst order condition yields s 1 = 5, which implies r 1 = 4 and veri…es Consumer 1 strategy (4; 5) is best response to Consumer 2's strategy. A graphical depiction of Consumer 1's best response problem is illustrated below. 
Feasible Set
A similar argument can be used to show that Consumer 2's best response to ( r 1 ; s 1 ) = (4; 5) is ( r 2 ; s 2 ) = (6; 5). Notice that Consumer 1's actions de…ne a personalized price equal to the Lindahl price for Consumer 2 equal to 3. The graphical depiction of Consumer 2's best response problem is given below. Since both players are best responding to each others actions, the unique Lindahl allocation of this example is achieved as a Nash equilibrium.
The second implication of Theorem 1 says that it is also possible to go in the other direction. Namely, if ( r 1 ; r 2 ; s 1 ; s 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism, the equilibrium allocation is Lindahl. To demonstrate this implication suppose ( r 1 ; r 2 ; s 1 ; s 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium, then the …rst order condition (with respect to statement s i ) yields s i = r 1 + r 2 2 for each i. Plugging this expression into each consumer's …rst order condition (with respect to their request) I have
for Consumer 1 and Consumer 2 respectively. Adding these two equations together and collecting terms yields
This veri…es that the Nash allocation amount of the public good is Pareto optimal. I then solve for the corresponding personalized prices to see that P 1 ( r; s) = P 1 = 1 and P 2 ( r; s) = P 2 = 3. Thus, the Nash allocation is Lindahl, completing the example.
Implementation in Quasi-Linear Environments
In this section, I show that the new Lindahl mechanism induces a supermodular game in quasi-linear E Q environments for certain values of the mechanism's parameters. Furthermore, I identify su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness and the stability of equilibrium in this environment. This aligns the desirable welfare properties of Lindahl equilibrium with the theoretical convergence properties of supermodular games. I begin however with following useful corollary of Theorem 1. The corollary exploits the strict concavity assumption of the valuation functions to demonstrate a unique Lindahl equilibrium in these environments and as a consequence of Theorem 1 a unique Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 1
For any e 2 E Q , the mechanism ' ; ; has a unique Nash equilibrium allocation.
For N players in the E Q environment, the new mechanism induces a supermodular game with an appropriate choice of mechanism parameters. Recall from De…nition 5 that @ 2 v i @x 2 is bounded from below by K i for all x 0. Theorem 2 therefore gives su¢ cient conditions for the game to be globally supermodular.
Theorem 2 For any e 2 E Q , the mechanism ' ; ; induces a supermodular game if
Theorem 2 shows, under certain conditions, the mechanism induces a supermodular game. If the strategy set for each player is a compact interval in R 2 then the game induced by the mechanism satisfy the Milgrom and Roberts properties mentioned previously. However, simply compacting the strategy set has a number of troubling consequences. Perhaps the most obvious of these is that the uniqueness result in Corollary 1 no longer applies since we exploited an unbounded strategy space in the proof. There may now exist boundary equilibrium which are not Lindahl equilibria. 4 In the next section, I discuss a su¢ cient condition for applying the Milgrom and Roberts results while maintaining uniqueness of equilibrium.
Stability
Since the goal is to …nd an environment with a robust stability property, I identify su¢ cient conditions for the Nash equilibrium in the E Q environment are stable under a wide variety of learning algorithms.
I have shown thus far that in quasi-linear environments, the mechanism ' has a unique Nash equilibrium and has the increasing di¤erence and supermodular properties. The only thing that needs to be checked therefore is that the reaction functions are not increasing at too fast a rate-i.e. if the slopes of the reaction functions are greater than one, the unique Nash equilibrium will be unstable and any non-equilibrium behavior will converge to plus or minus in…nity.
The following theorem gives su¢ cient conditions for the new mechanism to be supermodular with reaction functions that are everywhere a contraction.
Theorem 3 If the parameter conditions of Theorem 2 are satis…ed and = , then the new mechanism is supermodular and each consumer's reaction functions are contractions.
If the strategy space is compacted so that equilibrium messages are in the interior of the action space, the mechanism ' satis…es the Milgrom and Roberts' dynamic stability properties. Therefore at the cost of shrinking the set of applicable preference environments to quasi-linear environments, I gain the fact that the only rationalizable strategies coincide with the Nash strategies and that the equilibrium is stable under other "adaptive"learning dynamics such as …ctitious play, k-period average best response, and Bayesian learning among others.
Comparison, Informational Complexity, and Discussion
I now compare the new Lindahl mechanism with the Lindahl mechanisms due to Kim (1993) and Chen (2002) . These two mechanisms share a similar game structure with the new mechanism which makes them ideal for comparison. I …rst brie ‡y explain the outcome functions for these mechanisms using the notation developed earlier. Afterwards, I compare them with the new mechanism. I do not go into the proofs of why these mechanisms work.
For details I refer the interested reader to the aforementioned articles. As in the new Lindahl mechanism, each of these mechanisms use a message space of R 2 , where a generic message for consumer i will take the form of m i = (r i ; s i ), where r i serves as i's request and s i as his statement about x. 5 The level of the public good is determined by the outcome function (r; s), and the individual consumer's tax function will again be denoted i (r; s).
In the Chen/Kim Mechanism, each consumer i chooses a request and a statement. The request helps determine the level of the public good, and both choices act to determine the level of the tax. The outcome functions of Chen's mechanism ' ; C are given as follows:
can be thought of as i 0 s personalized price for the public good and > 0, 0 are constant parameters. The Kim mechanism is simply the Chen mechanism with = 1 and = 0. Chen recognized that adding additional statement penalty terms created the complimentarities required to make the mechanism supermodular.
There are several key di¤erences between the new mechanism and Chen's mechanism which are worth distinguishing. All of the important di¤erences are derived from the choice of the personalized price function.
Di¤erences in Penalty Structure
For consumer i, the personalized price function of the new mechanism only depends on the statement of consumer i + 1. The personalized price of Chen's mechanism depends on the statements o¤ all of the other players. This innocuous choice of personalized price function actually suggests several issues. The …rst is a potential welfare issue related to the statement penalties.
In order to get the right complementarity between actions in quasi-linear environments, this choice of personalized price requires Chen to include a separate squared di¤erence penalty for each consumer in the economy. In other words, a term 2 (s j (r; s)) 2 is added to the Chen's tax function for each consumer j 6 = i in the economy. While in equilibrium each of these terms will be equal to zero and drop out of the tax function, when out of equilibrium, even small incorrect statements by each player can quickly increase the taxes each consumer has to pay (the magnitude of the penalties depends on the speci…c parameterization of the mechanism). This very welfare issue was documented by Van Essen, Lazzati, and Walker (2008). In the experiment, subject's incorrect statements created, at times, large losses to both themselves as well as group members, large revenue swings to the government, and overall losses in e¢ ciency.
The Chen mechanism yields a zero statement penalty only when all consumers are coordinating on a particular statement. Simple day to day experience tells us that it is easier to miss-coordinate when more people are involved. It therefore stands to reason that since the Chen mechanism requires coordination from more people, there will be more penalties from the lack of coordination leading to both higher e¢ ciency losses and more violations of individual rationality. There is thus reason to expect that this welfare issue gets worse as more consumers are added to the process.
Since consumers in the new mechanism only have one penalty term connected to the statement of their neighbor, statement penalties for a consumer are zero when the paired consumers are coordinating. The penalty for each consumer in the same situation mentioned above will be signi…cantly smaller. Furthermore, since for any economy size N , the new mechanism's personalized price for consumer i only depends on the statement of his neighbor i + 1, it maintains this bilateral coordination structure as N increases.
This observation also indirectly highlights another important di¤erence.
Di¤erences in Information Requirements
Despite the theoretical assumption of complete information, the majority of public good experiments have been conducted under incomplete information protocols -i.e., subjects were only aware of their own payo¤ function. This type of experiment seems more consistent with a real world setting where it is unlikely that subjects would have knowledge of one another's payo¤ functions. The interpretation of Nash equilibrium then becomes one of a steady state of some dynamic learning process (think Cournot best reply) rather than a common knowledge/ introspection argument. Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose I was to design an experiment to test the Chen mechanism or the new mechanism in the lab under an incomplete information protocol. What is the minimum amount of information a subjects would need to compute their own payo¤ (or best response)? 6 Information Requirement for Consumer i (New Mechanism): It is clear that for N > 2, these two mechanisms have a di¤erent information requirement. Furthermore this di¤erence gets bigger as N grows. Speci…cally, as the economy gets larger, participants in the Chen mechanism N independent pieces of data to be able to compute their payo¤s. 7 The information requirement for the new mechanism always stays constant at 2. This di¤erence is illustrated in the graph below. 
New Mechanism
If I de…ne information complexity as the minimum dimension of data needed to compute ones payo¤, the Chen mechanism becomes more complicated as N increases. The new mechanism does not share this property
Conclusion
In this paper, I have introduced a new incentive compatible mechanism capable of implementing Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibria. While a simpli…ed economy with two goods was used for the exposition, it is straightforward to generalize the mechanism to accommodate economies with an arbitrary number of private and public goods. Second, motivated by experimental observations and Chen's 2002 mechanism, I have shown conditions under which this new mechanism satis…es the increasing di¤erence and supermodularity properties. I then use these observations to identify a set of preference environments which will be robustly stable and implement a unique Nash equilibrium. Finally, unlike the Chen mechanism, this mechanism does not increase in complexity as the number of the consumers gets large. The importance of this particular property is an empirical question and is well posed to be answered by additional experimentation in the laboratory.
Finally, there are several interesting areas for future research in this topic. For instance, it is known that stable Lindahl mechanisms can be found in quasi-linear preference environments. And while the stability results in quasi-linear environments are important, it is unknown what is the maximum preference domain for stable environments. A natural extension of the quasi-linear environments could be those de…ned by generalized Bergstrom-Cornes preferences. It would also be nice to know if it is possible to …nd a Lindahl mechanism that is stable for some environments and always in budget balance; or a stable, one choice variable, Lindahl mechanism. Finally, there needs to be more experiments on implementation theory. Experiments on mechanisms with various properties will help give researchers a better handle on what mechanism characteristics work or do not work behaviorally when they look to develop new theory.
Appendix
The strategy for the proof of Theorem 1 will be as follows: …rst, I demonstrate that a Nash allocation is Pareto optimal via an argument similar to the one used by Groves and Ledyard (1979) ; second, using the fact that the Nash allocation is Pareto optimal, I use an "unbiasedness" proof similar to Foley (1970) p. 68-69 and Chen (2002) to establish that the outcome is Lindahl; …nally, I show that any Lindahl allocation is achieved as a Nash allocation of the mechanism using a technique I believe was …rst used by Walker (1981) . ( r; s) is a Nash equilibrium of ' ; ; for e 2 E , where ( x; y i ) is the Nash allocation, then the following statements are true:
Lemma 1 Suppose
1. For any bundle (x; y i ) 2 C i , there is a pair (r i ; s i ) such that x = (r i ; r i ; s i ; s i ).
2. The private good consumed by consumer i in equilibrium is y i ! i i ( r; s) :
3. Consumer i's statement and tax are s i = 1 N P N i=1 r i and i ( r; s) = P i ( r; s) ( r; s) for all i:
4. The set of weakly preferred bundles for consumer i , denoted by
where t i is the marginal tax rate evaluated at the Nash equilibrium-i.e., t i P i ( r; s).
8. If y i + i (r i ; r i ; s i ; s i ) < y i + i ( r; s) = ! i and x = 1 N (r i + P j6 =i r j ), then y i + t i x < y i + t i x.
9. If (x; y i ) 2 C i such that (x; y i ) i ( x; y i ), y i + t i x > y i + t i x:
Proof of (1). Since only depends on the requests of individuals, set
Proof of (2). Consider the following two bundles ( ( r; s) ; y i ) and ( ( r; s) ;ŷ i ) 2 C i ; where 0 ŷ i < ! i i ( r; s) : Since preferences are complete, transitive, and strictly increasing in y i , I have ( ( r; s) ; y i ) i ( ( r; s) ;ŷ i ) for allŷ i .
Proof of (3). Since ( r; s) is a Nash equilibrium, then for each consumer i From the functional form of the tax function and since preferences are complete, transitive, and strictly increasing in y i , for each i, s i = 1 N P N i=1 r i . It follows directly that i ( r; s) = P i ( r; s) ( r; s).
Proof of (4). Choose two arbitrary members (x; y i ), ( x; y i ) 2 C i \ W P i . Since preferences are complete, assume that (x; y i ) % i ( x; y i ). For any 2 [0; 1], letx = x + (1 ) x andŷ i = y i + (1 ) y. Since C i is convex, the bundle (x;ŷ i ) 2 C i . In addition, from convexity of preferences I have (x;ŷ i ) % i ( x; y i ). It follows from transitivity that (x;ŷ i ) % i ( x; y i ) :
Proof of (5). Suppose not. Then y i + i ( r i ; s i ; r i ; s i ) < y i + i ( r; s) = ! i . Continuity, strictly increasing in y i , convexity of preferences, and continuity of i imply that there exists ( y i ; r i ; s i ) such that ( ( r i ; r i ; s i ; s i ) ; y i ) 2 C i , y i + i ( r i ; r i ; s i ; s i ) ! i , and ( ( r i ; r i ; s i ; s i ) ; y i ) i ( x; y i ). However, this means that there is an individually feasible bundle which is strictly preferred to the Nash allocation. This contradicts the assumption that ( r; s) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of (6). Suppose not. Then ( r i ; s i ) is not a best response which contradicts the assumption that ( r; s) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of (7) .
. From part 4 of Lemma 1, I have that W P i is a convex set and by de…nition ( x; y i ) is on the boundary of W P i . Let the set of a¤ordable bundles be denoted B i = (x; y i ) 2 C i jy i +^ i (x; r i ; s) ! i . B is convex since^ i is a convex function of x. By part 2 of Lemma 1, ( x; y i ) is also on the boundary of set B i . From part 6 of Lemma 1, the intersection of the relative interiors of sets W P i and B i is empty. From the Separating Hyperplane Theorem, there exists a hyperplane through ( x; y i ) that separates W P i and B i . The vector (t i ; 1) de…nes this hyperplane. As a consequence of the Separating Hyperplane Theorem, I now have that y i + t i x c and y i + t i x = c, where c 6 = 0. It follows that y i + t i x y i + t i x.
Proof of (8). If y i + i (r i ; r i ; s i ; s i ) < y i + i ( r; s) = ! i , I can expand each of these expressions to y i + P i (r i ; r i ; s i ; s i ) (r i ; r i ; s i ; s i ) + 2 (s i x) 2 + 2 (s i+1 x) 2 < y i + P i ( r; s) ( r; s). Let x = (r i ; r i ; s i ; s i ) and x = ( r; s). By construction, the personalized price function P i (r i ; r i ; s i ; s i ) = P i ( r; s) = t i . I can subtract the two squared terms on the LHS to get y i + t i x < y i + t i x.
Proof of (9). Suppose not. By part 7 of Lemma 1, I have y i +t i x = y i +t i x. Since preferences are continuous there exists a neighborhood of (x; y i ) ; de-noted N (x; y i ) such that for all (x;ŷ i ) 2 N (x; y i ) \ C i , (x;ŷ i ) i ( x; y). The "no minimum wealth assumption," parts 1, 6, and 8 of Lemma 1 imply that there exists a bundle ( x;
for all 2 (0; 1)g. All points in this line between ( x; y i ) and (x; y i ) have a value smaller than ( x; y i ). However since the consumption set is convex it follows that there exists a which is small enough such that N (x; y i ) \ G -i.e. there exists a bundle (x;ŷ i ) such that (x;ŷ i ) i ( x; y) andŷ i + t i x < y i + t i x which leads to a contradiction of part 7 of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 Suppose ( r; s) is a Nash equilibrium of ' ; ; for e 2 E , then the Nash allocation ( r; s) ;
is not a Pareto optimal allocation and that x; (y i ) N i=1 is a feasible, Pareto superior allocation. From part 9 of Lemma 1, I have that
This implies
Re-writing the above strict inequality, I have that
Thus, the Pareto superior bundle is not feasible. ) .
F is a convex set and the point ( x 1 ; :::; x N ; y 1 ; :::; y N ), associated with the Nash equilibrium, is on the boundary of F .
Proof. To show that F is convex choose two arbitrary pro…les (x 1 ; :::; x N ; y 1 ; :::; y N ), ( x 1 ; :::; x N ; y 1 ; :::; y N ) 2 F . For 2 [0; 1], the convex combination of these two vectors is ( x 1 + (1 ) x 1 ; :::; x N + (1 ) x N ; y 1 + (1 ) y 1 ; :::; y N + (1 ) y N ) .
. Adding these two conditions together, I have the following inequality,
Steps (1), (2) , and (3) verify that the set F is convex. To see that ( x 1 ; :::; x N ; y 1 ; :::; y N ) is in the boundary of the set. Recall from the Lemma 2 that the fact that the Nash allocation is Pareto optimali.e. Since C i is convex, ( x i + (1 ) x i ; y i + (1 ) y i ) 2 C i for all i. Without loss of generality since preferences are complete let ( x i ; y i ) % i (x i ; y i ) for all i. From convexity, I have that (
for all i. This veri…es convexity. By de…nition, the point ( x 1 ; :::; x N ; y 1 ; :::; y N ) associated with the Nash allocation is on the boundary of D:
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof for this theorem will be in two parts.
(Part 1): I will …rst show that if ( r; s) is a Nash equilibrium of ' ; ; , the corresponding allocation
i is a Lindahl equilibrium and for each i, P i ( r; s) is the corresponding Lindahl price. This will be done in 3 steps: …rst, I show that the personalized price associated with the Nash equilibrium per unit tax P i ( r; s) de…nes a separating hyperplane between the feasible allocation set F and the preferred set D; second, I show that the Nash allocation is the allocation that maximizes a consumer's preferences subject to a budget constraint when facing the personalized price P i ( r; s); …nally, I show that the tax revenue equals the cost of producing the public good. The intersection of the interiors of F and D have no points in common. Suppose not. Then there is a strictly cheaper feasible point that is weakly preferred by all consumers. However, this contradicts the fact that ( x 1 ; :::; x N ; y 1 ; :::; y N ) is Pareto optimal (Lemma 2).
By the separating hyperplane theorem, there exists a vector (p x 1 ; ; p x N ; p y 1 ; ; p y N ) 6 = 0 and c 2 R such that for all points in the weakly preferred set D,
In addition, since the vector ( x 1 ; :::; x N ; y 1 ; :::; y N ) is in the boundary of both F and G,
p y i y i = c: Since ( r; s) is a Nash equilibrium, the hyperplane that crosses through ( x; y i ) is de…ned by the vector of (p x i ; p y i ) = (t i ; 1) for all i where p x i = t i = P i ( r; s) (Lemma 1). This can be thought of as consumer i's personalized price.
(Step 2): Next I show that the bundle ( x; y i ) maximizes the preferences of consumer i subject to i's budget constraint when facing P i ( r; s) as his personalized price.
Suppose (x i ; y i ) i ( x; y i ) while x j = x and y j = y j for all j 6 = i. This point is in set D. From the separating hyperplane de…ned above I have,
All terms in this expression are the same except those belonging to consumer i. Thus this expression can be simpli…ed to y i + P i ( r; s) x y i + P i ( r; s) x. From part 9 of Lemma 1, equality cannot hold. I then have P i ( r; s) x + y i > P i ( r; s) x + y i :
By construction, the personalized price for consumer i is independent {'s actions-i.e., P i ( r; s) = P i (r i ; r i ; s i ; s i ) for all r i and s i . Plugging this into the above expression and adding two appropriately chosen positive terms on the LHS, I have
However, this is equivalent to
Thus, any bundle that is strictly preferred to the Nash bundle is not a¤ordable by the consumer-i.e., the Nash allocation maximizes consumer i's preferences subject to a budget constraint.
(Step 3): The last part of the argument requires tax revenue to equal the total cost of production.
If I add up the tax revenue, I have that
Thus the allocation is feasible and this is a Lindahl allocation, where P 1 ; :::; P N will be the pro…le of Lindahl prices. 
is the corresponding Lindahl allocation, then it must correspond to a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. I …rst show that the messages that would could this allocation in the mechanism are unique. Subsequently that this pro…le of strategies are a Nash equilibrium.
(Step 1): For all i, let s i = x. Consider the following system of N linear equations and N variables (r 1 ; :::; r N )
It is straightforward to verify that the N N coe¢ cient matrix of this system of equations is non-singular with a rank of N . Thus, the system has a unique solution which I will call ( r; s). 
! for all r i . Similarly, since preferences are strictly increasing in y i , it is also true that
! for all r i ; s i . By construction, the public good Plugging in these expressions into the above inequality, we have ( ( r; s); ! i i ( r; s)) % i (r i ; r i ; s i ; s) ; ! i i (r i ; r i ; s i ; s i ) for all r i , s i . Therefore ( r; s) is a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism:
Proof of Corollary 1. Let be the sum of each individuals initial endowment-i.e., = P ! i . For any e 2 E Q , Pareto optimal levels of the public good will be solutions to the following maximization problem
Since each v i (x) is a strictly concave function, there is a unique solution x to the problem. Since the Pareto optimal amount of the public good is unique and v i (x) is a strictly concave function, there are unique Lindahl prices P i = dv i ( x) dx , for each i. As long as for each player i, this price is a¤ordable-i.e., ! i P i x 0. I have a feasible and unique Lindahl equilibrium
i . From Theorem 1, I know that there is a unique Nash equilibrium that corresponds to this allocation.
Proof of Theorem 2. Since M i = R 2 , it is a sublattice of R 2 . By de…nition of being in the E Q environment u i is C 2 and therefore trivially satis…es the continuity requirement. To see that u i has the supermodularity property, I appeal to the fact that the utility function is C 2 . I therefore need to check the following cross-partial derivative @ 2 u i @r i @s i 0
Checking this, I see that @ 2 u i @r i @s i = N 0
for each consumer i. The increasing di¤erence property requires checking the following …ve conditions:
(1) @ 2 u i @r i @r j 0 for all j 6 = i (2) @ 2 u i @r i @s j 0 for all j 6 = i and j 6 = i + 1
(3) @ 2 u i @r i @s i+1 0 (4) @ 2 u i @s i @r j 0 for all j 6 = i (5) @ 2 u i @s i @s i+1 0
Checking each of these in turn I have @ 2 u i @r i @r j = 1 N (N 1) N 2 N 2 + 1 N 2 @ 2 v i @x 2 :
In order for the above expression to be positive I need N 1 N + @ 2 v i @x 2 for all j 6 = i:
A more compact way of writing this is
Condition 2 is trivially satis…ed since @ 2 u i @r i @s j = 0 for all j 6 = i and j 6 = i + 1:
Checking Condition 3 I have @ 2 u i @r i @s i+1 = N + N :
This expression is positive for all i if and only if :
Condition 4 and 5 are always satis…ed since @ 2 u i @s i @r j = N > 0 and @ 2 u i @s i @s i+1 = 0
Therefore, for the mechanism to be supermodular the following is su¢cient.
Finally, this interval is non-empty if and only if N 1 + min i2I K i is true.
Proof of Theorem 3. For the reaction functions to be a contraction the slope must be everywhere less than one. @r i @s i+1 = @ 2 u i @r i @s i+1 @ 2 u i @r 2
This implies that N + (N 1) < @ 2 v i @x 2 , a condition which is always satis…ed if = . Next with respect @r i @r j = @ 2 u i @r i @r j @ 2 u i @r 2
This implies N (N 1) < 2 @ 2 v i @x 2 + 2 + 2 or < 2(N 1)
. If I substitute = . I have the following condition
The expression on the RHS is always positive. The expression on the LHS is less than or equal to zero for N 2. The remaining reaction functions are already contractions.
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